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ORCIDSocial Choice and Welfare, Volume 21
Volume 21, Number 1, August 2003
- Gil S. Epstein, Shmuel Nitzan:
Political culture and monopoly price determination. 1-19 - Kotaro Suzumura, Yongsheng Xu
:
Recoverability of choice functions and binary relations: some duality results. 21-37 - Effrosyni Diamantoudi, Licun Xue:
Farsighted stability in hedonic games. 39-61 - Miguel A. Ballester, Juan R. de Miguel:
Extending an order to the power set: The Leximax Criterion. 63-71 - Biung-Ghi Ju:
Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in exchange economies: General domain properties and applications. 73-93 - Edi Karni:
Impartiality and interpersonal comparisons of variations in well-being. 95-111 - Yew-Kwang Ng:
Appropriate discounting of future utilities need not be the dictatorship of the present: A note on Chichilnisky. 113-116 - Somdeb Lahiri:
Justifiable preferences over opportunity sets. 117-129 - Sam Bucovetsky:
The optimal majority with an endogenous status quo. 131-148 - Michel Regenwetter, A. A. J. Marley, Bernard Grofman:
General concepts of value restriction and preference majority. 149-173 - Walter Kanning, Arnald J. Kanning:
Book review. 175-178
Volume 21, Number 2, October 2003
- Claude d'Aspremont, François Maniquet:
Foreword. 179-180 - Peter J. Hammond:
Equal rights to trade and mediate. 181-193 - William Thomson:
On monotonicity in economies with indivisible goods. 195-205 - Erik Schokkaert, Kurt Devooght:
Responsibility-sensitive fair compensation in different cultures. 207-242 - Marc Fleurbaey, Alain Trannoy:
The impossibility of a Paretian egalitarian. 243-263 - Lars Ehlers, Bettina Klaus:
Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems. 265-280 - Claude d'Aspremont, Jacques Crémer, Louis-André Gérard-Varet:
Correlation, independence, and Bayesian incentives. 281-310 - Frédéric Gaspart:
A general concept of procedural fairness for one-stage implementation. 311-322 - François Maniquet:
Implementation of allocation rules under perfect information. 323-346 - Marc Fleurbaey:
On the informational basis of social choice. 347-384
Volume 21, Number 3, December 2003
- John Broome:
Obituary. 385 - Ilia Tsetlin, Michel Regenwetter, Bernard Grofman:
The impartial culture maximizes the probability of majority cycles. 387-398 - Josep Freixas, William S. Zwicker:
Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of approval. 399-431 - Thomas C. Ratliff:
Some startling inconsistencies when electing committees. 433-454 - Jac C. Heckelman:
Probabilistic Borda rule voting. 455-468 - Biung-Ghi Ju:
A characterization of strategy-proof voting rules for separable weak orderings. 469-499 - Yukihiro Nishimura:
Optimal commodity taxation for reduction of envy. 501-527 - Donald E. Campbell:
Book review. 529-530
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