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Journal of Philosophical Logic, Volume 5
Volume 5, Number 1, February 1976
- Ermanno Bencivenga:

Set theory and free logic. 1-15 - Michael Devitt:

Suspension of judgment: A response to Heidelberger on Kaplan. 17-24 - Allen Hazen:

Expressive completeness in modal language. 25-46 - Kenton F. Machina:

Truth, belief, and vagueness. 47-78 - Bryan Norton:

Is counterpart theory inadequate? 79-89 - Carl J. Posy:

Varieties of indeterminacy in the theory of general choice sequences. 91-132 - Orin Safir:

Concrete forms - Their application to the logical paradoxes and Gödel's theorem. 133-154
Volume 5, Number 2, May 1976
- Alan Code:

Aristotle's response to Quine's objections to modal logic. 159-186 - Brian Ellis:

Epistemic foundations of logic. 187-204 - W. D. Hart, Colin McGinn:

Knowledge and necessity. 205-208 - Geoffrey Sampson:

An empirical hypothesis about natural semantics. 209-236 - Ernst-Walther Stachow:

Completeness of quantum logic. 237-280 - Thomas S. Weston:

Kreisel, the continuum hypothesis and second order set theory. 281-298
Volume 5, Number 3, August 1976
- John Bigelow:

Possible worlds foundations for probability. 299-320 - Ronald N. Giere:

A laplacean formal semantics for single-case propensities. 321-353 - Henry E. Kyburg Jr.:

Chance. 355-393 - Sherry May:

Probability kinematics: A constrained optimization problem. 395-398 - Stephen Spielman:

Exchangeability and the certainty of objective randomness. 399-406 - Stephen Spielman:

Carnap's robot and inductive logic. 407-415 - Bas C. van Fraassen:

Representational of conditional probabilities. 417-430 - Patrick Suppes, Mario Zanotti:

Necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of a unique measure strictly agreeing with a qualitative probability ordering. 431-438
Volume 5, Number 4, November 1976
- Michael Byrd:

Single variable formulas in S4→. 439-456 - Susan Haack:

Some preliminaries to ontology. 457-474 - Virginia Klenk:

Intended models and the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem. 475-489 - Gail C. Stine:

Intentional inexistence. 491-510 - Charles G. Morgan:

Tuomela on deductive explanation. 511-525 - Raimo Tuomela:

Morgan on deductive explanation: A rejoinder. 527-543

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