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ORCIDJournal of Economic Theory, Volume 159
Volume 159, Part A, September 2015
- Giulio Codognato, Sayantan Ghosal
, Simone Tonin:
Atomic Cournotian traders may be Walrasian. 1-14
- Frank Rosar:
Continuous decisions by a committee: Median versus average mechanisms. 15-65
- Alex McAvoy:
Comment on "Imitation processes with small mutations" [J. Econ. Theory 131 (2006) 251-262]. 66-69
- Antoine Salomon, Françoise Forges:
Bayesian repeated games and reputation. 70-104 - Gaetano Antinolfi, Francesco Carli:
Costly monitoring, dynamic incentives, and default. 105-119
- Ryota Iijima:
Iterated generalized half-dominance and global game selection. 120-136
- Albin Erlanson, Karol Flores-Szwagrzak:
Strategy-proof assignment of multiple resources. 137-162 - Kiryl Khalmetski, Axel Ockenfels, Peter Werner:
Surprising gifts: Theory and laboratory evidence. 163-208
- Martin C. Byford:
A theoretical foundation for the undercut-proof equilibrium. 209-220
- Sophie Bade:
Randomization devices and the elicitation of ambiguity-averse preferences. 221-235 - Pär Holmberg, Bert Willems:
Relaxing competition through speculation: Committing to a negative supply slope. 236-266
- Takuro Yamashita:
Strategic and structural uncertainty in robust implementation. 267-279
- Christoph Wagner, Tymofiy Mylovanov, Thomas Tröger:
Informed-principal problem with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and no limited liability. 280-289 - Axel Anderson:
A dynamic generalization of Becker's assortative matching result. 290-310
- Pawel Dziewulski:
Efficiency of competitive equilibria in economies with time-dependent preferences. 311-325
- Gerelt Tserenjigmid:
Theory of decisions by intra-dimensional comparisons. 326-338 - Francesco Lippi, Stefania Ragni, Nicholas Trachter:
Optimal monetary policy with heterogeneous money holdings. 339-368 - Sotiris Georganas, Paul J. Healy, Roberto A. Weber:
On the persistence of strategic sophistication. 369-400 - Ludovic Renou, Tristan Tomala:
Approximate implementation in Markovian environments. 401-442 - Itai Arieli, Robert J. Aumann:
The logic of backward induction. 443-464 - Faruk Gul, Wolfgang Pesendorfer:
Hurwicz expected utility and subjective sources. 465-488 - Jess Benhabib, Alberto Bisin, Shenghao Zhu:
The wealth distribution in Bewley economies with capital income risk. 489-515 - Val E. Lambson, John van den Berghe:
Skill, complexity, and strategic interaction. 516-530 - Paul Heidhues, Sven Rady, Philipp Strack:
Strategic experimentation with private payoffs. 531-551 - Jan Christoph Schlegel:
Contracts versus salaries in matching: A general result. 552-573 - Jakub Steiner, Colin Stewart:
Price distortions under coarse reasoning with frequent trade. 574-595 - Nathan Larson:
Inertia in social learning from a summary statistic. 596-626 - Christian Kellner:
Tournaments as a response to ambiguity aversion in incentive contracts. 627-655
- Marion Oury:
Continuous implementation with local payoff uncertainty. 656-677
Volume 159, Part B, September 2015
- Dirk Bergemann, Alessandro Pavan:
Introduction to Symposium on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design. 679-701 - Thomas Kruse, Philipp Strack:
Optimal stopping with private information. 702-727 - Mustafa Akan, Baris Ata, James D. Dana Jr.:
Revenue management by sequential screening. 728-774 - Daniel F. Garrett, Alessandro Pavan:
Dynamic managerial compensation: A variational approach. 775-818 - Dirk Bergemann, Philipp Strack:
Dynamic revenue maximization: A continuous time approach. 819-853 - Vasiliki Skreta:
Optimal auction design under non-commitment. 854-890 - Rahul Deb, Maher Said:
Dynamic screening with limited commitment. 891-928 - Jianjun Miao, Yuzhe Zhang:
A duality approach to continuous-time contracting problems with limited commitment. 929-988 - Noah Williams:
A solvable continuous time dynamic principal-agent model. 989-1015 - Bruno H. Strulovici, Martin Szydlowski:
On the smoothness of value functions and the existence of optimal strategies in diffusion models. 1016-1055 - Katalin Bognar, Tilman Börgers, Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn:
An optimal voting procedure when voting is costly. 1056-1073 - Dirk Bergemann, Achim Wambach:
Sequential information disclosure in auctions. 1074-1095
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