


default search action
Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 152
Volume 152, July 2014
- Vlad Mares, Jeroen M. Swinkels

:
On the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions. 1-40 - Mathias Staudigl, Simon Weidenholzer:

Constrained interactions and social coordination. 41-63 - Jean Guillaume Forand:

Two-party competition with persistent policies. 64-91
- Michael Richter

:
Fully absorbing dynamic compromise. 92-104
- Tayfun Sönmez, M. Utku Ünver

:
Altruistically unbalanced kidney exchange. 105-129 - Guilherme Carmona

, Konrad Podczeck:
Existence of Nash equilibrium in games with a measure space of players and discontinuous payoff functions. 130-178 - Steven Perkins, David S. Leslie

:
Stochastic fictitious play with continuous action sets. 179-213 - Juan Gabriel Rodríguez

, Rafael Salas
:
The Gini coefficient: Majority voting and social welfare. 214-223
- Laurens Cherchye

, Thomas Demuynck
, Bram De Rock
:
Revealed preference analysis for convex rationalizations on nonlinear budget sets. 224-236
- Sushil Bikhchandani

, Uzi Segal:
Transitive regret over statistically independent lotteries. 237-248
- João Montez

:
One-to-many bargaining when pairwise agreements are non-renegotiable. 249-265
- Daniel Quint:

Imperfect competition with complements and substitutes. 266-290
- Blake A. Allison, Jason J. Lepore:

Verifying payoff security in the mixed extension of discontinuous games. 291-303
- Manolis Galenianos

:
Hiring through referrals. 304-323 - Laurence Ales, Christopher Sleet:

Revision proofness. 324-355 - Erik Mohlin:

Optimal categorization. 356-381 - Shiri Alon, David Schmeidler:

Purely subjective Maxmin Expected Utility. 382-412

manage site settings
To protect your privacy, all features that rely on external API calls from your browser are turned off by default. You need to opt-in for them to become active. All settings here will be stored as cookies with your web browser. For more information see our F.A.Q.


Google
Google Scholar
Semantic Scholar
Internet Archive Scholar
CiteSeerX
ORCID













