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ORCIDJournal of Economic Theory, Volume 133
Volume 133, Number 1, March 2007
- Hitoshi Matsushima
:
Mechanism design with side payments: Individual rationality and iterative dominance. 1-30 - Aviad Heifetz, Chris Shannon, Yossi Spiegel:
What to maximize if you must. 31-57 - Ilan Kremer, Andrzej Skrzypacz:
Dynamic signaling and market breakdown. 58-82 - Francis Bloch, Matthew O. Jackson:
The formation of networks with transfers among players. 83-110 - Hannu Vartiainen:
Subgame perfect implementation: A full characterization. 111-126 - John Hassler, Kjetil Storesletten, Fabrizio Zilibotti:
Democratic public good provision. 127-151 - Rose-Anne Dana, Marco Scarsini:
Optimal risk sharing with background risk. 152-176 - Teck-Hua Ho, Colin F. Camerer, Juin-Kuan Chong:
Self-tuning experience weighted attraction learning in games. 177-198 - Christos Koulovatianos, Leonard J. Mirman:
The effects of market structure on industry growth: Rivalrous non-excludable capital. 199-218 - Steven Scroggin:
Exploitable actions of believers in the "law of small numbers" in repeated constant-sum games. 219-235 - Igor Kopylov:
Subjective probabilities on "small" domains. 236-265 - Josef Falkinger:
Attention economies. 266-294 - Dieter Balkenborg, Karl H. Schlag:
On the evolutionary selection of sets of Nash equilibria. 295-315 - Kazuya Hyogo:
A subjective model of experimentation. 316-330 - Mihai Manea:
Core tâtonnement. 331-349 - Kaushik Basu, Tapan Mitra:
Utilitarianism for infinite utility streams: A new welfare criterion and its axiomatic characterization. 350-373 - Robert C. Marshall, Leslie M. Marx:
Bidder collusion. 374-402 - Abel Cadenillas, Jaksa Cvitanic, Fernando Zapatero:
Optimal risk-sharing with effort and project choice. 403-440 - John O. Ledyard, Thomas R. Palfrey:
A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments. 441-466 - Marc-Andreas Muendler:
The possibility of informationally efficient markets. 467-483 - Marc Möller:
The timing of contracting with externalities. 484-503 - Andreas Blume, April M. Franco:
Decentralized learning from failure. 504-523
- Tao Zhu, Neil Wallace:
Pairwise trade and coexistence of money and higher-return assets. 524-535 - Chongmin Kim, Kam-Chau Wong:
Network formation and stable equilibrium. 536-549 - Drew Fudenberg, Markus Mobius, Adam Szeidl:
Existence of equilibrium in large double auctions. 550-567 - Eugenio Peluso, Alain Trannoy:
Does less inequality among households mean less inequality among individuals? 568-578
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