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ORCIDGames and Economic Behavior, Volume 75
Volume 75, Number 1, May 2012
- Dilip Abreu, Mihai Manea:
Markov equilibria in a model of bargaining in networks. 1-16 - Franziska Barmettler, Ernst Fehr, Christian Zehnder
:
Big experimenter is watching you! Anonymity and prosocial behavior in the laboratory. 17-34 - Siegfried K. Berninghaus, Karl-Martin Ehrhart, Marion Ott:
Forward-looking behavior in Hawk-Dove games in endogenous networks: Experimental evidence. 35-52 - Catherine Bobtcheff, Thomas Mariotti:
Potential competition in preemption games. 53-66 - Anat Bracha, Donald J. Brown:
Affective decision making: A theory of optimism bias. 67-80 - Isabelle Brocas, Juan D. Carrillo:
From perception to action: An economic model of brain processes. 81-103 - Brendan Daley, Michael Schwarz, Konstantin Sonin:
Efficient investment in a dynamic auction environment. 104-119 - Andrei Dubovik, Maarten C. W. Janssen:
Oligopolistic competition in price and quality. 120-138 - Eric J. Friedman:
Asymmetric Cost Sharing mechanisms. 139-151 - Hans Peter Grüner, Yukio Koriyama:
Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: A possibility theorem. 152-167 - Magnus Hoffmann, Grégoire Rota-Graziosi:
Endogenous timing in general rent-seeking and conflict models. 168-184 - Cheng-Cheng Hu, Min-Hung Tsay, Chun-Hsien Yeh:
Axiomatic and strategic justifications for the constrained equal benefits rule in the airport problem. 185-197 - Matthew O. Jackson, Tomas Rodriguez-Barraquer, Xu Tan:
Epsilon-equilibria of perturbed games. 198-216 - Chiu Yu Ko, Hideo Konishi:
Profit-maximizing matchmaker. 217-232 - Nenad Kos:
Communication and efficiency in auctions. 233-249 - Vincent Mak, Amnon Rapoport, Eyran J. Gisches:
Competitive dynamic pricing with alternating offers: Theory and experiment. 250-264 - Priscilla T. Y. Man:
Forward induction equilibrium. 265-276 - V. Filipe Martins-da-Rocha, Yiannis Vailakis:
Harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes: A counterexample. 277-282 - Debasis Mishra, Arunava Sen:
Roberts' Theorem with neutrality: A social welfare ordering approach. 283-298 - Erik Mohlin:
Evolution of theories of mind. 299-318 - Arjan Non:
Gift-exchange, incentives, and heterogeneous workers. 319-336 - Sunanda Roy, Tarun Sabarwal:
Characterizing stability properties in games with strategic substitutes. 337-353 - Aric P. Shafran:
Learning in games with risky payoffs. 354-371 - Mathias Staudigl:
Stochastic stability in asymmetric binary choice coordination games. 372-401 - Christian Trudeau:
A new stable and more responsive cost sharing solution for minimum cost spanning tree problems. 402-412
- Geoffroy de Clippel, David Pérez-Castrillo, David Wettstein:
Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information. 413-423 - Mark Fey:
Symmetric games with only asymmetric equilibria. 424-427 - Taro Kumano, Masahiro Watabe:
Dominant strategy implementation of stable rules. 428-434 - Yoshihiro Ohashi:
Two-person ex post implementation. 435-440 - Makoto Shimoji:
Outcome-equivalence of self-confirming equilibrium and Nash equilibrium. 441-447
Volume 75, Number 2, July 2012
- Marina Agranov, Elizabeth Potamites, Andrew Schotter, Chloe Tergiman:
Beliefs and endogenous cognitive levels: An experimental study. 449-463 - Enriqueta Aragonès, Dimitrios Xefteris:
Candidate quality in a Downsian model with a continuous policy space. 464-480 - Aurélien Baillon, Bram Driesen, Peter P. Wakker:
Relative concave utility for risk and ambiguity. 481-489 - Salvador Barberà, Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno:
Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: On what domains are they also sufficient? 490-509 - Andreas Blume:
A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender-receiver games. 510-517 - Aaron L. Bodoh-Creed:
Ambiguous beliefs and mechanism design. 518-537 - Leonardo Boncinelli, Paolo Pin:
Stochastic stability in best shot network games. 538-554 - Yves Breitmoser:
Strategic reasoning in p-beauty contests. 555-569 - Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari, Maria Bigoni:
Cooperative strategies in anonymous economies: An experiment. 570-586 - Yi-Chun Chen:
A structure theorem for rationalizability in the normal form of dynamic games. 587-597 - Prabal Roy Chowdhury, Kunal Sengupta:
Transparency, complementarity and holdout. 598-612 - Daniele Condorelli:
What money can't buy: Efficient mechanism design with costly signals. 613-624 - Adam Dominiak, Peter Duersch, Jean-Philippe Lefort:
A dynamic Ellsberg urn experiment. 625-638 - John William Hatfield, Nicole Immorlica, Scott Duke Kominers:
Testing substitutability. 639-645 - Patrick Hummel:
Deliberative democracy and electoral competition. 646-667 - Pedro Jara-Moroni:
Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players. 668-684 - Fuhito Kojima:
School choice: Impossibilities for affirmative action. 685-693 - Michael D. König, Stefano Battiston, Mauro Napoletano, Frank Schweitzer:
The efficiency and stability of R&D networks. 694-713 - Silvana Krasteva, Hüseyin Yildirim:
On the role of confidentiality and deadlines in bilateral negotiations. 714-730 - Bernard Lebrun:
Optimality and the English and second-price auctions with resale. 731-751 - Marc Lelarge:
Diffusion and cascading behavior in random networks. 752-775 - Dunia López-Pintado:
Influence networks. 776-787 - Jason R. Marden, Jeff S. Shamma:
Revisiting log-linear learning: Asynchrony, completeness and payoff-based implementation. 788-808 - Igal Milchtaich:
Comparative statics of altruism and spite. 809-831 - Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, John E. Roemer:
A common ground for resource and welfare egalitarianism. 832-841 - Jonathan Newton:
Coalitional stochastic stability. 842-854 - Carlos Oyarzun, Rajiv Sarin:
Mean and variance responsive learning. 855-866 - Cameron Parker:
The influence relation for ternary voting games. 867-881 - Bary S. R. Pradelski, H. Peyton Young:
Learning efficient Nash equilibria in distributed systems. 882-897 - Stephanie Rosenkranz, Utz Weitzel:
Network structure and strategic investments: An experimental analysis. 898-920 - Leonidas Spiliopoulos:
Pattern recognition and subjective belief learning in a repeated constant-sum game. 921-935 - Peter Troyan:
Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare. 936-947 - Rodrigo A. Velez, William Thomson:
Let them cheat! 948-963 - Rui R. Zhao:
Renegotiation and conflict resolution in relational contracting. 964-983
- Scott Duke Kominers:
On the correspondence of contracts to salaries in (many-to-many) matching. 984-989 - Laurent Lamy:
On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts. 990-999 - Petra Nieken, Patrick W. Schmitz:
Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment. 1000-1008 - Toru Suzuki:
Competitive problem solving and the optimal prize schemes. 1009-1013 - Simon Weidenholzer:
Long-run equilibria, dominated strategies, and local interactions. 1014-1024
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