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ORCIDGames and Economic Behavior, Volume 44
Volume 44, Number 1, July 2003
- Yan Chen
, Yuri Khoroshilov:
Learning under limited information. 1-25 - John Dickhaut, Margaret Ledyard, Arijit Mukherji, Haresh Sapra:
Information management and valuation: an experimental investigation. 26-53 - Thomas Kittsteiner:
Partnerships and double auctions with interdependent valuations. 54-76 - Volker Nocke, Martin Peitz:
Hyperbolic discounting and secondary markets. 77-97 - Francesco Squintani:
Moral hazard, renegotiation, and forgetfulness. 98-113 - Balázs Szentes, Robert W. Rosenthal:
Three-object two-bidder simultaneous auctions: chopsticks and tetrahedra. 114-133 - Roberto A. Weber:
'Learning' with no feedback in a competitive guessing game. 134-144 - Georg Weizsäcker:
Ignoring the rationality of others: evidence from experimental normal-form games. 145-171 - Itzhak Gilboa, David Schmeidler:
A derivation of expected utility maximization in the context of a game. 172-182 - María Paz Espinosa, Inés Macho-Stadler:
Endogenous formation of competing partnerships with moral hazard. 183-194
Volume 44, Number 2, August 2003
- Dilip Abreu, Rajiv Sethi:
Evolutionary stability in a reputational model of bargaining. 195-216 - Michael R. Baye, Heidrun C. Hoppe:
The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games. 217-226 - Elchanan Ben-Porath, Michael Kahneman:
Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring. 227-250 - Lawrence E. Blume:
How noise matters. 251-271 - Ezra Einy, Diego Moreno, Benyamin Shitovitz:
The value of public information in a Cournot duopoly. 272-285 - Kfir Eliaz:
Nash equilibrium when players account for the complexity of their forecasts. 286-310 - Marina Núñez, Carles Rafels:
Characterization of the extreme core allocations of the assignment game. 311-331 - Larry Samuelson, Jeroen M. Swinkels:
Evolutionary stability and lexicographic preferences. 332-342 - William H. Sandholm:
Evolution and equilibrium under inexact information. 343-378 - Tomoichi Shinotsuka, Koji Takamiya:
The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: implementation in Nash equilibrium. 379-389 - Doron Sonsino, Julia Sirota:
Strategic pattern recognition - experimental evidence. 390-411 - Juan J. Vidal-Puga, Gustavo Bergantiños:
An implementation of the Owen value. 412-427
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