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Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 32
Volume 32, Number 1, July 2000
- Abhijit Banerjee, Jörgen W. Weibull:

Neutrally Stable Outcomes in Cheap-Talk Coordination Games. 1-24 - Bruno Broseta:

Adaptive Learning and Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Coordination Games: An ARCH(1) Approach. 25-50 - Shinji Ohseto

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Characterizations of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms for Excludable versus Nonexcludable Public Projects. 51-66 - Gooni Orshan, José Manuel Zarzuelo

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The Bilateral Consistent Prekernel for NTU Games. 67-84 - Rajiv Sethi

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Stability of Equilibria in Games with Procedurally Rational Players. 85-104 - Dale O. Stahl:

Rule Learning in Symmetric Normal-Form Games: Theory and Evidence. 105-138 - J. R. G. van Gellekom, Jos A. M. Potters, J. H. Reijnierse, M. C. Engel, Stef Tijs:

Characterization of the Owen Set of Linear Production Processes. 139-156
Volume 32, Number 2, August 2000
- Alvaro Sandroni

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Reciprocity and Cooperation in Repeated Coordination Games: The Principled-Player Approach. 157-182 - Ross Cressman:

Subgame Monotonicity in Extensive Form Evolutionary Games. 183-205 - Krishnendu Ghosh Dastidar

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Is a Unique Cournot Equilibrium Locally Stable? 206-218 - Fredrik Andersson, Hans Carlsson, Håkan J. Holm:

The 17th Arne Ryde Symposium, "Focal Points - Coordination, Complexity, and Communication in Strategic Contexts". 219 - Michael Bacharach, Dale O. Stahl:

Variable-Frame Level-n Theory. 220-246 - Venkataraman Bhaskar:

Egalitarianism and Efficiency in Repeated Symmetric Games. 247-262 - André Casajus:

Focal Points in Framed Strategic Forms. 263-291 - Håkan J. Holm:

Gender-Based Focal Points. 292-314 - Frederick W. Rankin, John B. Van Huyck

, Raymond C. Battalio:
Strategic Similarity and Emergent Conventions: Evidence from Similar Stag Hunt Games. 315-337

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