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ORCIDGames and Economic Behavior, Volume 153
Volume 153, 2025
- Spyros Galanis
:
No trade under verifiable information. 1-9 - Jens Gudmundsson, Jens Leth Hougaard, Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, Lars Peter Østerdal:
Optimizing successive incentives: Rewarding the past or motivating the future? 10-29 - Shuhei Morimoto:
Strategy-proofness, efficiency, and the core in matching problems with transfers. 30-41 - Simon Loertscher, Ellen V. Muir:
The matching benefits of market thickness. 42-66 - Austin Brooksby, Jacob Meyer, Lucas Rentschler, Vernon Smith, Robbie Spofford:
"Equilibrium play in voluntary ultimatum games: Beneficence cannot be extorted" - Comment. 67-93 - Arianna Degan, Yushen Li, Huan Xie:
Favor exchange with private costs: An experiment. 94-112 - Felix Brandt, Chris Dong, Dominik Peters:
Condorcet-consistent choice among three candidates. 113-130 - Shota Ichihashi, Alex Smolin:
Data provision to an informed seller. 131-144 - Sabine Fischer, Kerstin Grosch:
Contract breach with overconfident expectations: Experimental evidence on reference-dependent preferences. 145-163 - Kriti Manocha, Bertan Turhan:
Gradual matching with affirmative action. 164-178 - Yifan Xiong, Guopeng Li, Youze Lang:
Pricing and information acquisition in networks. 179-208 - Jan Heufer, Jason M. Shachat, Yan Xu:
Measuring tastes for equity and aggregate wealth behind the veil of ignorance. 209-232 - Daiki Kishishita, Susumu Sato:
Watchdog versus yes man: News source and media competition. 233-253 - David Lagziel, Yevgeny Tsodikovich:
Working with AI: An analysis for rational integration. 254-267 - Amanda Chuan, Hanzhe Zhang:
Pay it forward: Theory and experiment. 294-314 - Xiaotie Deng, Yotam Gafni, Ron Lavi, Tao Lin, Hongyi Ling:
From monopoly to competition: When do optimal contests prevail? 268-293 - Shimon Kogan, Florian H. Schneider, Roberto A. Weber:
Self-serving biases in beliefs about collective outcomes. 315-344 - Tuva Bardal, Ulle Endriss:
Axiomatic analysis of approval-based scoring rules. 345-358 - Gabrielle Demange:
Dual communication in a social network: Contributing and dedicating attention. 359-385 - Chin-Chia Hsu, Amir Ajorlou, Ali Jadbabaie:
A game-theoretic model of misinformation spread on social networks. 386-407 - Alexander Clyde:
Proxy variables and feedback effects in decision making. 408-429 - Tyler Maxey:
Corrigendum to "School choice with costly information Acquisition" [Games and Economic Behavior Volume 143 (2024) 248-268]. 430 - Paula Onuchic:
Advisors with hidden motives. 431-450 - Yangbo Song:
Social learning among opinion leaders. 451-473 - Jonathan Newton, Miharu Naono:
Maxmin, coalitions and evolution. 474-498 - David Piazolo, Christoph Vanberg:
Legislative bargaining with private information: A comparison of majority and unanimity rule. 499-522 - Peter Bils, Federica Izzo:
Policy gambles and valence in elections. 523-540 - Héctor Hermida-Rivera:
Minimal stable voting rules. 541-553 - Steven Kivinen:
Robust group manipulation with indifferences. 554-568 - Petros G. Sekeris:
Propaganda and conflict. 569-585 - Konstantinos Protopappas, David Rietzke:
Incentivizing variety in innovation contests with specialized suppliers. 586-621 - Segismundo S. Izquierdo, Luis R. Izquierdo:
Statistical inference in games: Stability of pure equilibria. 622-644 - Jian Song, Daniel Houser:
Costly waiting in dynamic contests: Theory and experiment. 645-678 - Ramtin Salamat:
Trial plans as a means of price discrimination. 679-701
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