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ORCIDGames and Economic Behavior, Volume 151
Volume 151, 2025
- Qian Jiao
, Zhonghong Kuang, Yiran Liu, Yang Yu:
Optimal tree contest design and winner-take-all. 1-23 - Evan M. Calford, Anujit Chakraborty:
The value of and demand for diverse news sources. 24-41 - Shinsuke Kambe:
The prevalence of take-it-or-leave-it offers. 42-58 - Keith Jin Deng Chan:
Inefficiency in a frictionless market. 59-69 - R. Pablo Arribillaga, Eliana Pepa Risma:
Obvious manipulations in matching with and without contracts. 70-81 - Dongri Liu, Jingfeng Lu:
An implementation of the general optimal mechanism in Esö and Szentes (2007). 82-94 - Olivier Bos, Martin Pollrich:
Auctions with signaling bidders: Optimal design and information disclosure. 95-107 - Andrea Gaunersdorfer, Josef Hofbauer:
Learning in unprofitable games. 108-126 - Xiaohui Bei, Shengxin Liu, Xinhang Lu:
Fair division with subjective divisibility. 127-147 - Srinivas Arigapudi, Yuval Heller:
Stable mixing in Hawk-Dove Games under best experienced payoff dynamics. 148-161 - Zhibin Tan, Cao Zhigang, Zhengxing Zou:
Comparative statics of minimum-cost-spanning-tree games. 162-182 - John Duggan, Jean Guillaume Forand:
Accountability in Markovian elections. 183-217 - Jurjen Kamphorst, Vladimir A. Karamychev:
Going through the roof: On prices for drugs sold through insurance. 218-242
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